“WHAT IS TO BE DONE?”: THE HEGEMONY OF SOLUTIONS IN IMMIGRANTS’ LABOUR-MARKET INTEGRATION

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Abstract

Skilled immigrants’ labour-market integration is a long-standing public policy issue that has generated a substantial body of scholarship in Canada. This article shares the scholarly concern while stepping off from the hegemony of training and learning as a solution for skilled immigrants’ challenges in the labour market. Drawing on a larger project on discourses of skill in the high-skilled labour market and post-liberalization Canadian nationalism, this article argues that training/learning initiatives are not innocent or equity generating. As such, their ideological purchase in integration scholarship needs to be challenged.

Résumé

L’intégration des personnes immigrantes qualifiées au marché du travail constitue depuis longtemps une question de politique publique qui génère un nombre important de recherches au Canada. Le présent article tient compte des préoccupations présentées dans les recherches tout en se distanciant de l’hégémonie d’une approche axée sur la formation et l’apprentissage pour permettre aux personnes immigrantes qualifiées de surmonter les difficultés rencontrées sur le marché du travail. S’inspirant d’un plus grand projet abordant les discours sur les compétences au sein du marché de la main-d’œuvre hautement qualifiée et sur le nationalisme canadien post libéralisation, cet article soutient que les initiatives de formation et d’apprentissage sont ni innocentes ni génératrices d’équité. Par conséquent, il faut remettre en question leur emprise idéologique dans les recherches sur l’intégration.

As the face of Canada grows more diverse, the income gap between residents who identify as visible minorities, Indigenous or recent immigrants and the rest of Canadians remains a yawning chasm. (Monsebraaten, 2017)

It is too tempting to proceed as usual. (Tuck, 2009, p. 412)
More than four decades after the introduction of a skill-based immigration policy in Canada, the 2016 Canadian census reported continuing labour-market marginalization of skilled immigrants (Keung, 2017; Monsebraaten, 2017). This is a long-standing public policy issue in Canada. Indeed, the latest census corroborates a finding that has been consistent since the 1990s (Preston et al., 2010). Anyone studying immigration from a critical, political-economic perspective will appreciate the role of the racialized immigrant precariat in sustaining global economies such as Canada’s. That is not what I am concerned with in this paper. Rather, what I draw attention to is the significant ideological appeal of remedial training as a panacea to immigrants’ labour-market integration in state policy making, scholarship, and practices of integration. Indeed, since shortly following the liberalization, Canada has had a vast multi-governmental, multi-stakeholder edifice of labour-market integration with a strong focus on training immigrants, including but not limited to mentoring, bridge training, and, increasingly commonly, retraining via various Canadian post-secondary institutions (see Adamuti-Trache, 2011; Biles, Drover, Henley, Ibrahim, & Yan, 2010; “Foreign Credential Recognition,” 2007). Over the last decade or so, the Canadian government has also shifted immigration policies toward recruiting more “job-ready” applicants—i.e., those with Canadian credentials/experience and international students and graduates (Sweetman & Warman, 2009)—who are considered “pre-integrated” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012) and, therefore, “ideal immigrants” (Government of Canada, 2015) by virtue of their being trained in Canadian post-secondary institutions (see Sweetman & Warman, 2010). Shortly after some of these policies came into effect, however, international students’ challenges in the labour market started raising the concerns of university administrators, policy makers, and scholars alike (see “International Migration,” 2011). It is interesting, to say the least, that the same discourse of remedial training that federally recruited skilled workers have long been invested with is now being mobilized for international students as well. Immigrants’ (and now international students’) marginalization in the labour market thus continues to be cast as a matter of remedial training. I envision this paper as a response to and a refusal of this stronghold of training/learning discourse in immigrant integration.

An impressive body of knowledge on skill and allied practices of training/learning confirms that liberal modernist discourses of skill, instead of strengthening workers’
rights and bargaining and negotiating power, frequently marginalize and hierarchize them along lines of race, gender, nationality and citizenship status, place of education, and so on (Ameeriar, 2017; Bauder, 2006; Berger & Mohr, 1975; Chatterjee, 2015; Girard & Bauder, 2007; Jackson, 1991; Puwar, 2004; Smith & Dobson, 2003). In Canada, for example, discourses of skill and training/learning have long been mobilized to place immigrants in hierarchical relations with workers invested with Canadian national subject identities. The stubborn labour-market barrier of Canadian experience—conceptualized as both hard, tangible credentials and soft, cultural skills—for example, has underpinned various initiatives for immigrants' labour-market integration. This has rendered “the Canadian” of Canadian experience—a fictitious yet discursively and ideologically White figure—as the ideal worker subject, who leaves the immigrant professional (a racialized category in Canada, especially following liberalization) stranded on the bridge to becoming a Canadian, always in the process of becoming (for recent policy overhauls underpinned by the logic of Canadianized training, see Bhuyan, Jeyapal, Ku, Sakamoto, & Chou, 2015; Chatterjee, 2016).

Drawing on my doctoral research on discourses of skill in the high-skilled labour market and post-liberalization Canadian nationalism, this paper transmits a rather straightforward message: training/learning initiatives for immigrants' labour-market integration, while prevalent in Canada (as in many other immigration jurisdictions), are not innocent and equity generating. As such, their ideological purchase in immigrant integration needs to be challenged.

I start with a brief critical overview of the emergence of the training/learning foci in Canadian immigrant integration. I question who/what it is beneficial for. I go as far as to say that training/learning is not so much the issue here as is the relationship between (largely racialized) immigrants and a historically White European national imaginary coming to terms with globally integrating economies. This globalized economic reality makes post-colonial Southern labour recruitment a nearly non-negotiable economic imperative and, in the process, throws a serious challenge to Canada's normative vision of itself. As long as the state is considered the key machinery of justice for immigrant workers, I suggest, we will fail to implicate it in the hierarchizing of Canadian and immigrant worker subjects via discourses of skill. I then suggest that to move beyond the hegemony of skill and training/learning in immigrant integration we need to stretch our political imagination beyond a rights-granting, benevolent nation-state invested in the well-being of its citizen subjects.

While launching this line of argument, I remain aware that migration and subsequent practices of integration (more often than not in host nation terms) are key ways that marginalized populations exercise their right to freedom in the current global order thriving on displacement and dispossession. As such, critiquing integration practices arguably focused on turning immigrants into contributing economic subjects (as pathway to social and political citizenship) is politically charged, especially from someone like me who can afford her critique due to, largely, academic class privilege. It is in anticipation of such critiques that I start with the long-standing and persistent issue of immigrants' labour-market marginalization, which, I believe, is a rather tangible rationale for being critical of the currently existing training/learning logic/apparatus. I then aim to further this critique by introducing the additional task (or a challenge) of envisioning an integration agenda invested in supporting the migration of people and their skills, yet free from the hegemony of solutions, especially of colonial modernist nature that render immigrants deficient.
The ideological construction of immigrants as deficient subjects has been powerfully critiqued by researchers and immigrant advocacy bodies (see www.beyondCanadianexperience.com for some anti-discriminatory policies introduced in the province of Ontario following some of these advocacy initiatives), and from an ethical perspective of respect for transnational difference (Guo, 2010, 2013). These initiatives, while important, continue to demonstrate an implicit faith in the liberal, equity-generating state with responsibility and intent for equality between its subjects. However, there are some strong arguments against the politics of recognition, especially as appropriated by the state in the context of its multicultural claims (Gibb & Hamdon, 2010; Goldberg, 2007; for limits of recognition of cultural difference for the project of justice, see also Fraser, 1995; Lash & Featherstone, 2001). Mojab (1999, 2009) has alerted us to lifelong learning scholarship's focus on the training paradigm that erases the exploitative relations between a capitalist state and the labour it recruits (see also Mojab, Ng, & Mirchandani, 2000). Such critiques bring us closer to the nation-making logics at work in immigrants’ labour-market integration. In some ways, this paper is a call to exercise our political imagination in similar (still marginal) ways so we are able to move away from the liberatory assumptions of training/learning. Elsewhere, I have written about the role that liberal assumptions about skill and training played in shaping integration scholarship in Canada (Chatterjee, 2016). Here I am interested in expanding the boundaries of practice, more so as immigrant integration—via discourses of skill—is deeply rooted in the lifelong learning principle of adult education. However, given that scholarship and practices/programs of labour-market integration in Canada are deeply entangled, a separate response is neither possible nor desirable. I therefore hope to start a dialogue that will resonate with multiple stakeholders and will eventually inform research, policy, and practice realms of the issue.

Training/Learning for Labour-Market Integration: Solution for Whom?

Operating with an overall common goal of bridging a perceived skills gap, remedial interventions into immigrant integration typically manifest as creating and streamlining pathways for immigrants into various sectors of the labour force (Alboim & Maytree Foundation, 2002; Austin, 2008; Duncan, 2008; Rasheed, 2009; Wilson, Sakamoto, & Chin, 2017). These include retraining, evaluating and enhancing existing credentials, mentoring, and connections between job seekers and employers, making integration a problem of bureaucracy, but largely of immigrants’ training, including their internationally obtained credentials and/or their ability to showcase themselves in particular ways that make sense to employers. The barrier of Canadian experience is particularly widely discussed and frequently responded to by employment support and advocacy bodies with an argument in favour of training for Canadian experience. Most training initiatives, whether for so-called tangible, hard skills requiring accreditation and licensing, or the soft, intangible ones speaking to cultural capital, are underpinned by discourses of Canadianness, Canadian standards, and suitability or fit to Canadian workplaces. In brief, while there is wide acknowledgement that finding skill-commensurate jobs is a more intense challenge for racialized immigrants, especially due to the demand for Canadian experience, employer
bias against international credentials, and employer risk-management tactics (tied to the question of familiarity/legibility of credentials), these are nevertheless assumed factual matters that are here to stay, redirecting attention to remedial mechanisms of an immediate and instrumental nature (see Myers & Conte, 2013; Reitz, 2001a, 2001b; Wanner, 2001). In such a focus, the exclusionary nationalist past of recruiting racialized immigrant labour for profit and expelling them from national membership on grounds of deficient subjecthood is actively abandoned in favour of liberal values of moving forward together, which cast labour-market barriers as mere acts of lingering racism to be rectified by liberal modes of mutual education and, particularly, by helping immigrants navigate barriers in the labour market. Thus, in contrast to centring systemic racial discrimination, navigating the barriers through innovative means and finding remedies to the “problem” of immigrants’ labour-market integration are appealed to as common-sense responses. “Strengthening the human capital of immigrants,” Wilson et al. (2017) wrote in their review of Canadian integration practices, has come to replace responses to “conditions of social inequality” (p. 116). In her fieldwork on Pakistani diasporic women in Toronto, Ameeriar (2017) summed up the Canadian government’s integration enterprise as “a barrage of regulatory proscriptions aimed at the immigrant body” (p. 2).

In a powerful call for a moratorium on damage-centred inquiries, Eve Tuck (2009) critiqued social science researchers’ “de facto reliance on a potentially problematic theory of change” (p. 413) that leads them to document damage with the hope of bringing political and material change. With regard to Indigenous communities of the Americas, whom Tuck was concerned with in her writing, such a change orientation left them over-researched, yet invisible. Similarly, a preoccupation with exclusion, access, and accommodation, observed by Mojab (2009) in her critique of lifelong learning scholarship on immigrant women, serves to “reframe” these issues into legal, administrative, and managerial terms. They also direct funding toward “professional focused service-oriented agencies” (Mojab, 2009, p. 8), since that is what appeals to the policy imagination—simple remedies for complex problems (see also Coffield, 1999).

In other words, remedial interventionism claims technical, depoliticized responses as solutions to problems of, essentially, a political nature. These cautions about the seductive and dangerous potential of documenting damage are important to keep in mind as we critically look back on decades of integration practices in Canada, overflowing as they are with narratives of immigrant suffering and various interventionist proposals.

I suggest that immigrant integration has been enthralled by a dogged appeal to solutions that needs to be disrupted. Disruption is required not only because training/learning, in this context and in the larger political economic discussions, has been proven to be ineffective for workers, but also to engage another important analytical consideration—i.e., how the hierarchy between trainee immigrants and their ideological-discursive opposite, the competent Canadian worker, produces Canada as a nation of superior standards that also offers benevolent support for those struggling to meet these standards. Consider how the training/learning initiatives, however necessitated by the immediacies of settlement,

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5 Frank Coffield critiqued lifelong learning as a poorly conceived approach to unemployment that became popular because it legitimates increased expenditure on education (e.g., contributing to a growing immigrant training market), gives politicians a pretext for action, and more importantly, promotes simple solutions for complex problems.
essentially reconfigure a border/barrier into a bridge and lead to the ideological construction of the skilled immigrant as a trainee subject standing at or navigating this border. With this explicit focus on navigating the border of Canadian experience, these initiatives render the border itself invisible and unproblematic. Michelle Goldberg (2007) succinctly presented the ideological outcome of the training foci: “In sum, this training discourse creates a deficit mentality where the identities of immigrant professionals are constructed as deficient, ‘in need of training,’ and ‘not up to Canadian standards.’ Their skills and experience are portrayed as unknown, suspicious and inferior” (p. 34). The dual moves of epistemic superiority and benevolent care are in sync with older nationalist narratives of immigrant labour recruitment and their expulsion from citizenship. However, we start to notice this only if/when we move beyond solution orientation and start attending to the manifestations of the nation in hegemonic narratives of solution.

Beyond the Hegemony of Solution Orientation: A Case for a Rescued Political Imagination

Following his staunch critique of lifelong learning as a form of social control, educator Frank Coffield (1999) nevertheless wrote that “it is incumbent, I think, on researchers funded by the public purse to address policy, where appropriate” (p. 479). Coffield was referring to a long-established social science tradition in which studying social problems and conceptualizing interventions are perceived to be on a continuum. In other words, in that view, the critic has a responsibility to offer interventions. For me, there is a dilemma here. On one hand, if we fail to explore, engage, and challenge the workings of the racially exclusionary nation via practices of integration, as I am proposing here, we fail critical inquiry whose raison d’être is social change. On the other hand, an exposé of nation formation may not offer enough practical political recourses to re-envision critical integration practices. Does this mean, however, that we rely on programmatic solutions at the cost of ignoring the very nation-state that has historically been the key actor in immigrants’ recruitment and their subsequent construction as deficient subjects? It is this tension between the demand for practical relevance (the liberal state and its policies being its key vehicles) and the dangers of erasing and exonerating the nation-state that makes me, rather petulantly perhaps, propose a refusal of solutions. I resort to Michel Foucault (1978), who, in his response to prison social workers who felt immobile following their reading of Discipline and Punish, opened up the horizon of critique:

Critiques do not have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, “this, then, is what needs to be done.” It should be an instrument for

6 Indeed, the metaphor of the bridge in its remedial progressivist sense, as in bridge training programs that facilitate opportunities and give a “hand up,” remains strikingly common in discussions of immigrants’ economic integration. In his 2013 budget speech, then finance minister Jim Flaherty, for instance, promised to build “bridges” between “skilled immigrants and Canadian opportunities.” A 2015 Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration praised bridging programs for helping “newcomers fill the gaps in their competencies and build a ‘bridge’ to licensure and/or employment” (Government of Canada, 2015, p. 13). A loan program for bridge training was recently described as having the purpose of “training to bring [immigrants] up to the national standards” (Levitz, 2015).

7 This seems an ironic proposition following his exposure of public policy’s insistence on simple solutions for complex problems.
those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, \textit{essays in refusal}. It does not have to lay down the law for the law. \textit{It isn't a stage in a programming}. It is a challenge directed to what is [emphasis added]. (p. 256)⁸

Building on Foucauldian insights, Scheurich (1994) suggested an alternative methodology for policy studies that “examines the naming process, the process by which problems enter the gaze of the state and policy researchers” (p. 300). Indeed, I ask how the labour-market integration of skilled immigrants became a problem of “their” skills and training. Ameeriar (2017) argued that integration in Canada, notably a nation-state that ceremoniously relinquished the assimilationist thesis of the melting pot, allows for the celebration of only some differences “alongside the eradication of others” (pp. 1–3). Thus, settlement agencies housed in Toronto’s most multi-ethnic neighbourhoods flaunting their ethnic specificities will have largely White adult educators tell professional immigrant women, for example, not to “show up smelling like foods that are foreign to us,” “don’t wear a shalwar cameeze,” “change your name if it is hard to pronounce,” and “don’t wear a hijab if you want to get a job.” Ameeriar documented the humiliation and frustration of the women as their expectation for a “skills-focused conversation” is diminished by “a cascade of proscriptions” thrown their way; a contradictory act that she read as the Canadian state’s deployment of racial projects while simultaneously disavowing them. Along a similar vein, this paper calls for the reconceptualization of the training/learning model of immigrant integration as an act of reassertion of the nation along discourses of skills, trainings, and standards. This will help us reorient the gaze from immigrant subjects to the recruiting nation-state by refusing to confine integration within the tidy parameters of a public policy awaiting neatly designed solutions.⁹

All this is not to suggest that solutions are not wanted, or that they do not matter. Being a scholar of migration and nationalism who is interested in the manifestation of the nation in the skilled labour market, I have often been asked about the application of my inquiry in everyday, “real life” situations. I appreciate the stark realities of immigrants’ economic marginalization in Canada (which continue to be the scenario for many immigrants as I write and have profound and intergenerational impacts on immigrant families) as material for a Kafkaesque nightmare. However, a focus on the everyday life, as if lived only viscerally,

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⁸ Foucault was referring to prison social workers who felt immobile following their reading of \textit{Discipline and Punish}: “…certain people, such as those who work in…institutional setting[s]… are not likely to find advice or instructions in my books that tell them ‘what is to be done.’ But my project is precisely to bring it about that they ‘no longer know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourse that up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous. This effect is intentional” (Foucault, 1978, p. 256). This is similar to what Foucault asked in relation to the formation of discourse in \textit{Politics and the Study of Discourse}: “Which utterances are destined to disappear without any trace? Which are destined, on the other hand, to enter into human memory through ritual recitation, pedagogy, amusement, festival, publicity? Which are marked down as reusable, and to what ends? Which utterances are put into circulation, and among what groups? Which are repressed and censored?” (as cited in Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991, p. 60).

⁹ In their trenchant critique of homelessness researchers’ preoccupation with the theorization of homelessness as a problem needing “causal explanation,” which leaves unexamined the “silently present ‘neoliberal norm’” of governing homeless subjects as policy problems, Farrugia and Gerrard (2016, pp. 275–276) offered a brilliant rendition of critical inquiry of this order, which, I hope, will inform practices of supporting homeless peoples.
makes the assertions of the nation in liberal interventionist terms recede into the background, nevertheless leaving us to deal with their violent aftermaths, manifest, ironically, in and as the everyday. After all, isn’t it the violence of Canadian nationalist claims of superiority, recast in the labour-market demand for local experience and responded to via training for Canadian experience, that immigrant workers live out in their daily lives?

My proposal to reorient integration away from corrective solutions is also not a judgment call on the critical scholarly and political desire to document and map, intervene and recommend, and finally usher in change. I write this paper in the classic spirit of inquiry; not to establish any truth, but to unsettle what appear to be problematic truth claims in practices of integration. I am concerned that in its current form, integration is preoccupied with reconciling a political economic system underpinned by racialized immigrant labour with an equally entrenched ideology of inferiority of racialized subjects, leaving little room for examining labour-market barriers as anything but an issue of training. In recasting the training/learning discourse as nationalist, I understand I am questioning a long tradition of practice pertaining to immigrants and scores of people who have committed their lives to understanding immigration and immigrant well-being in various big and small ways. This paper is not about putting a stop to these activities. What I am rather concerned with is the productive nature of these initiatives for the nation-state of Canada. This involves questioning and challenging the racialized assumptions of skill-deficit—masquerading as common sense, something that needs to be done—that in turn shape “foreign” immigrants and “native” Canadians as learning and teaching subjects, respectively. And this happens under the auspices of a liberal democracy that claims to treat these subjects as equal. What I instead propose is this: while nationalism on ethnic and racial foundations is long considered a practice of the past, especially following the liberalization of Canadian immigration, nationalism in its older, exclusionary form continues to lurk beneath the facade of “liberating” discourses of skill and training. An overt and exclusive focus on training/learning renders immigrants’ recruitment as skill-rich and devaluation as skill-deficient as random phenomena arising from policy errors, instead of productive contradictions that allow the state to be proactive about immigrant labour recruitment (thus continuing to devise newer policies) while being defensive about its ideological superiority (the construction of “job-readiness” as Canadian experience). I further argue that the enduring life of such an interventionist logic is a conspicuous sign of immigrants’ continued lack of membership in Canada. What makes this a difficult sale, however, is the status of training/learning in a neo-liberal political economic climate.

While remaining invested in seeking justice for immigrants, I strive against the desire for programmatic solutions that drive immigrant integration. This status quo does need to be challenged if we are to appreciate integration as one of myriad complex sites in which the liberal Canadian nation is reclaiming its boundaries in an era of universal, multicultural membership. It is here that I draw on the idea of a rescued political imagination from Spivak. In her critique of various, largely Asian regional responses to an international political economic system dominated by the United States, Spivak (2008) said it is impossible to not partake in this global game of “competing capitalisms”:

If we are interested in working for a just world with an international system, it’s no use trying to give up the global game. What one needs to think of is in what ways one can constantly train people to interrupt the
global game, to remind it that all of these games are supposed to be for human beings...They're not of course...the thing to do is to train people to see these are false promises. (pp. 244–245)

What kind of political imagination can be fostered so we can see the “false promises” of training/learning for labour-market integration? I am particularly drawn to refusal of solution orientation as a response. Manuel Castells (2010) considered social change to be the prerogative of specific social actors in specific social contexts, and as such, “abstain[ed] from suggesting any cure for the ills of our world” (p. 394). For scholars and community advocates working with Indigenous peoples, Tuck (2009) suggested a move from damage-centred research to desire and complexities, and a need to recast the very same data that have been used to prove damage to communities without, however, denying the damage that has been and continues to be done.\(^\text{10}\) In the current context, a refusal of solution-orientation invests us with the task of imagining integration beyond what I have been critiquing—that is, one that supports the mobility of people (and therefore their skills) without proposing colonial solutions, especially of the type that leaves untroubled the nexus between racialization of immigrants and national political imaginary of who belongs and on what grounds.

The problem of immigrants’ labour-market integration has been conceived of and responded to in dissociation from the various discourses of deficit and danger that have historically shaped the Canadian nation.\(^\text{11}\) Indeed, a neglect of this history played an important part in the way integration came to be understood (e.g., as a public policy problem needing a fix), and it also informed how responses came to be devised (e.g., training for Canadian experience and the recent institutionalization of Canadian experience in recruitment policies). An active consideration of how the national past we think we have moved beyond keeps resurfacing in our supposedly liberal, multicultural present will, therefore, allow a much-needed examination of contemporary integration’s liberal solution orientation. It will allow a necessary reorientation of our critique from resolving labour-market marginalization via training/learning to the deeper historical and political structures (internally between racialized immigrants and people invested with Canadian subject identities, and externally between immigrant source and recruiting countries) that such marginalization perpetuates (see Warren, 2009). We will be able to see that mere training gaps or administrative mismanagement are not why skilled immigrants cannot find skill-commensurate jobs; rather, de-skilling followed by retraining are organized practices through which the liberal Canadian state creates distinctions between workers with national subject and immigrant identities. The claims of superior standards and benevolent concern have been packaged in sensitized liberal discourses of skilling and training immigrants to bring them at par with national standards. In short, skill discourses have allowed Canada

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\(^{10}\) Tuck referred to Kenneth and Mamie Clark’s famous doll test, whose use in the historic Brown v. Board of Education case (1954), she suggested, informed theories of social change. She referred to various layers of findings in the doll test that were overlooked and suggested that the underlying, problematic theory of change in the litigation may explain why racial hierarchies remain largely untroubled even when public schools are no longer segregated.

\(^{11}\) Another piece of this complexity that is beyond the scope of this paper pertains to the systematic usage (or lack thereof) of Indigenous labour in the development of the Canadian economy. This remains a commitment to and invitation for further research.
to continue to be the White nation it has historically been envisioned as without explicitly mobilizing discourses of race. These suggestions to move beyond mere interventionism, however, are likely to be alien in the policy and practice realms. After all, public policies (e.g., immigration, citizenship) and their programmatic machinery (e.g., in the form of integration and settlement) typically function and take shape by taking the liberal nation-state for granted. I wonder, however, how a foregrounding of the training/learning initiatives as an ideological project of the nation may shift our focus away from the narrative of the skill-deficient immigrant needing interventions. How would we see immigration and immigrant integration differently if we could make this shift happen? Is it likely to make simple solutions to this highly complex problem unthinkable? As stated by Eve Tuck (2009) in the epigraph to this paper, the status quo in thinking and practice is “too tempting.” What do we risk if we can’t make this shift happen?

References


Chatterjee, “WHAT IS TO BE DONE?”


