ALL ADULT EDUCATORS ARE CITIZENS, NOT ALL CITIZENS ARE ADULT EDUCATORS: A RESPONSE TO IAN BAPTISTE

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Abstract
This article proposes a counter-argument to Ian Baptiste's "Beyond Reason and Personal Integrity: Towards a Pedagogy of Coercive Restraint" (CJSAE, 14(1), May, 2000). I argue that we must make a fundamental distinction between the adult educator (who must never use violent means to attain particular ends) and the citizen (who is faced with risky choices that may require, in extraordinary circumstances, violent actions). Once persons don the robe of the adult educator, they must seek to enlighten the other, and engage in non-violent, educative acts whenever possible. Under no circumstance can adult educators use coercion, deception or manipulation to achieve educational purposes.

Résumé
Cet article propose un contre-argument à celui de Ian Baptiste, dans son article "Beyond Reason and Personal Integrity: Toward a Pedagogy of Coercive Restraint" (RCÉÉA, 14(1), Mai, 2000). Je conteste que nous devons faire une distinction essentiel entre l'éducateur d'adulte (qui doit jamais recourir à la violence pour atteindre leurs résultats particulier) et le citoyen (qui, face à des situations extraordinaires, et des choix risqué, peuvent mérite la violence). Des que les personnes portent la robe de formation permanente, ils doivent cherchez à avancer les autres, et engager, quand possible, les actes éducatifs non-violents. En aucun cas doivent les éducateurs en formation permanente se permettre d'utiliser la violence, la déception ou la manipulation pour atteindre leurs buts pédagogique.

Ian Baptiste's "Beyond Reason and Personal Integrity: Toward a Pedagogy of Coercive Restraint" (CJSAE, 14(1), May, 2000), is a provocative essay. The title itself almost stops one in his tracks. Baptiste is calling us to go "beyond reason" and "personal integrity"? I would have thought that our world didn't have enough of either. And "pedagogy" allied with "coercion"? What is going on here? Well, I am not quite sure, but it may be that Baptiste wonders how critical theory can be "practically effective in a
world of force, coercion, and manipulation" (Fay, 1987, p. 142). It may be, too, that he has thrown in the towel on the enlightenment project. By enlightenment project, I mean the historical emergence, beginning roughly in the 15th century in Europe and crystallizing in the late 18th, of a world outlook that affirmed that humankind could emerge from a state of "self-incurred immaturity" through the exercise of autonomous reason and rational learning processes. The enlightenment project has appeared in history in the struggle against clericalism and orthodoxies; in politics as the "struggle for freedom of thought, equal rights and the commonweal against privileged capriciousness and despotism," in the natural sciences as the "transference of natural scientific forms of thought and methods to the entire investigation of the knowable world"; and in the philosophical struggle against the hegemony of metaphysics. "Out of the ferment of this powerful movement of emancipation, the great ideas have proceeded on which rests the order of the secular world: human rights, separation of powers, toleration, domination [mastery] of nature and the political world through science and technology—but above all, the great thought of the solidarity of all humanity beyond the border of cultures and religions" (Picht, 1996, pp. 371-372). Each of the latter struggles presupposes that talk is better than fighting, that reason sets itself against all forms of coercion that would prevent open and free learning and inquiry into the variegated domains of human existence.

For Baptiste, the enlightenment project, announced in 1784 by Immanuel Kant, now appears to sit toothless amidst the rubble and debris of our postmodern world of "bountless maladies" (Baptiste’s phrase). In such a bleak world, Baptiste tells us, adult educators must be willing to pronounce closure on dialogue and take up cudgels against the perpetrators of bad things. Indeed, this is an enticing temptation. Our meditations on a post-9/11 world easily turn grim and melancholic. Suddenly, we are more terrified than ever before—the incineration of the World Trade Centre in New York is added to the litany of ozone depletion, global warming, species extinction, acid rain, desertification, deforestation, global recession, collapsing Third World economies, and terrorist networks in the suburbs. The gods of war appear to have taken hold of the minds of crazed religious fanatics and leaders of the American Empire alike who promise us a "war against terror" that will go on indefinitely. Rather than arising from a state of self-incurred immaturity, humankind is in danger of being swept back into a darker age of barbarism and predatory incivility.

Early in his essay, Baptiste calls us to look around our world and notice the "grave social maladies." Perhaps the gravest malady of all in post-World
War II history is the way Israel has acted in Palestine. In the U.S. and Canada the mainstream media perpetuates the "preposterous claim that Israel is the victim, that the Palestinians are the aggressors in a four-decade war that the Israeli army has waged against civilians, property and institutions without mercy or discrimination" (Said, January 10-16, 2002). Today Palestinians are trapped in 220 army-controlled, tiny, disconnected ghettos, their houses, olive groves and fields mowed down on a daily basis, their businesses and schools and civil institutions totally disrupted, their land expropriated for Israeli settlement and highways, the invasion of more and more settlers, prevention of entering Jerusalem, their holiest of sites, the exploitation of natural resources (illegally drawing 25% of Israel’s water and leaving Palestinian aquifers thirsty), burying the fragile environment under massive settlements and highways and turning it into a disposal site for industrial and urban waste (Halper, 2001).

At the time of writing (February, 2002), Israel continues to twist the screw of suffering on the Palestinian people: Sharon intends to keep the violence stoked up to undermine and discredit any claim to an independent state, let alone full rights of citizenship for Palestinians living in Israel. No wonder Palestinian poet, Mahmoud Darwish, believes that "The earth is closing on us, pushing us through the last/passage, and we tear off our limbs to pass through." These acts of the Israeli government are beyond reason and speak of the abrogation of the values of the enlightenment project. What troubles Baptiste is that perpetrators (like Sharon perhaps?) "do not readily exhibit self-restraint." I agree. But then without much warning, Baptiste tells us that when these perpetrators of violence fail to exhibit self-restraint, adult educators (at least those serious about redressing social injustices) must try to "coercively restrain the perpetrators."

Let’s make no mistake here. Baptiste uses the world "coerce" and is addressing "adult educators." Coerce means to persuade an unwilling person by force. Baptiste is advocating that, under certain circumstances, adult educators may coerce those engaged in violent acts to stop. He has, in my view, made a fundamental logical error by conflating the roles of citizen and adult educator. In our roles as citizens of liberal constitutional democracies, we are entitled to liberal rights (e.g., to assembly, free speech, a fair trial). We accept that in constitutionally guaranteed circumstances, the state has the right to use coercive means to ensure the rule of law. We also accept, in the interest of stability and order and the common good, restrictions on our everyday lives and individual freedoms (e.g., stopping at traffic lights). More controversially, those of us inhabiting liberal democracies can also resort to
various forms of civil disobedience. One of the most well-known forms of
civil disobedience is non-violent protest (King and Gandhi are exemplars).
The actions of King and Gandhi and their followers assumed, however, that
the oppressors were in fact susceptible to enlightenment. By attempting to
restrain coercively the oppressors through non-cooperation with power, non-
violent actors believed that their oppressors could learn that their actions
were immoral or misguided.

One can also make powerful moral arguments that in circumstances such
as Rwanda, some men and women would be impelled to act to stop the
murderers from destroying their communities and families by coercive means
at hand. If I am, in fact, forced into such a desperate act of resisting my own
(or my family's) destruction in circumstances wherein the norm of respect
has been radically violated and reciprocal dialogue impossible, I am acting in
unusually horrific circumstances in which rational learning processes have
been defied. In the case of Palestine, the moral argument—widely accepted
in the international community—is that the Palestinians have the right to
defend themselves against the occupation of their land. In both cases, men
and women, faced with dire and difficult choices, are acting as citizens and
not as educators. Habermas admits that there are situations that are "either
scurrilous or simply ridiculous; in such situations we must act as best we
can—but then without appealing to a theory, whose capacity for justification
does not extend that far" (1973, p. 37).

I am emphatically not acting as an adult educator when I use violent
means to stop my family from being murdered or rush to prevent a hijacker
from steering a plane into destruction. When I, with a group of citizens,
interpose myself between the Israeli army and defenceless Palestinian
citizens surrounding their homes, I am engaging in a non-violent, educative
act oriented to "persuading public opinion in civil and political society (or
economic society) that a particular law is illegitimate and a change is
warranted" (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. 587). To be sure, I do not have the
moral right as a Canadian citizen to ask the Palestinians (or any other
occupied people) to adopt a passivist standpoint and eschew all forms of
violence. But, as an adult educator I believe that I am morally and ethically
obligated to counsel men and women to resist violence through defending an
open and free civil society (which includes building public spheres that cross
various boundaries). All adult educators are citizens, but not all citizens are
adult educators. This is the crux of my argument with Baptiste.

Baptiste simply informs us that educators ought to "restrain the
perpetrators of injustices." He thinks that it is reasonable to attempt to
enlighten by “appealing to reason and personal integrity,” but when “social injuries are sustained and grave” or committed by “true enemies,” then “justice demands that we [adult educators] restrain the perpetrators.” Why does justice demand that educators qua educators restrain the perpetrators? Seemingly unaware of what it will take to convince us, Baptiste commits a second logical error. If he collapses the citizen into educator, he also collapses the “organization of enlightenment” and the “organization of action.” Educators are concerned with the first; citizens with the latter. In Theory and Society (1973), Jurgen Habermas distinguishes these two processes. In his essay, “Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis,” Habermas argues that the mediation of theory and praxis can only be clarified by distinguishing three separate functions. First, the task of critical social science is to form and extend “critical theorems” (which can stand up to scientific discourse and validation processes). Second, these theorems are tested by the initiation of processes of reflection carried on within certain groups. Third, the selection of appropriate strategies, solution of tactical questions, and the conduct of the political struggle. Habermas explains that “On the first level, the aim is to true statement, on the second, authentic insights, and on the third, prudent decisions” (p. 32). Theory must enlighten those to whom it is addressed, they must recognize themselves in the offered interpretations.

For Habermas it is imperative that the “organization of action” be distinguished from this “process of enlightenment” (p. 33). The enlightenment process (which cannot be engineered or manipulated) cannot legitimize beforehand the “risky decisions of strategic action. Decisions for the political struggle cannot at the outset be justified theoretically and then carried out organizationally....there can be no theory which at the outset can assume a world-historical mission in return for the potential sacrifices” (p. 33). Anyone who is even modestly aware of the history of Bolshevism in the former Soviet Union knows that this gigantic experiment in coercive education of the masses flowed freely out of the fusion of Science and Party as the repository of Enlightenment and blueprints for action. On a lesser scale, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas manipulated “popular education” in the service of their political goals. The results were disastrous. I cannot think of one example where adult education’s enlightenment project failed to be corrupted by getting entangled in various forms of armed struggle. The doors inevitably clang shut on open and un-coerced communicative learning processes, both during the armed engagement and after, when a new state assumes power. Adult education must stand four square for the mobilization
of people for enlightenment and not violent action. We must be educational conscientious objectors.

Habermas insists that the three functions cannot be fulfilled under the one and same principle. For example, the process of enlightenment (if educators are to avoid exploitation and deception) can only be organized under the precondition that those who carry out the active work of enlightenment commit themselves wholly to the proper precautions and assure scope for communicative learning processes in a non-coercive environment. And the tyranny of instrumental pedagogies (manifest in history in endless varieties) can only be avoided when a political struggle is "legitimately conducted under the precondition that all decisions of consequence will depend on the practical discourse of the participants—here, too, and especially here, there is no privileged access to truth" (pp. 33-34). Habermas’ important distinction between the organization of enlightenment and the organization of action enables us to locate the role of the adult educator in the enlightenment process, and there alone. When the adult educator engages with others in political action, she has donned the robe of citizen. Political action is always risky, unpredictable, messy; there are lessons to be learned, but later.

Baptiste argues that adult educators have a “duty to stop all forms of injurious actions.” But from where does this moral imperative derive? He does not provide us with the necessary arguments. I might be willing to entertain the argument that as an adult educator, I have the responsibility to create the pedagogical conditions that enable all learners at my site to deliberate with each other free of coercion and symbolic violence. Indeed, I as adult educator can become increasingly alert to the ways that the integrity of the learning situation is violated. But beyond lecturing us that we as adult educators have a duty to stop all forms of injurious actions, Baptiste says very little about the range of issues pertaining to how organizing to stop injurious actions should occur. Upon what moral grounds would Baptiste justify violent collective action? His unacceptable answer, I believe, is that we ought to act violently because “true enemies,” rather than simply “misguided foes,” exist in the world.

This categorization of humankind—a single, marvellously flawed species—into “true enemies” and “friends” is dangerous. Using this language casts some outside the ring of humanness and easily leads us to demonize them. This mode of thought has often supported the outright elimination of the enemy (those deemed not to share the true identity of the chosen). Beginning in the 12th century, we see the emergence of a way of thinking that
breaks with the classic Greco-Roman division of a single humanity into citizens and non-citizens (Hannaford 1996). Baptiste’s argument is particularly dangerous in the post 9/11 cultural climate where the average American (and Canadian) is “drowned in a storm of media pictures and stories almost completely cleansed of anything in foreign affairs but the patriotic line issued by the government...America is fighting the evils of terrorism, America is good, and anyone who objects is evil and anti-American” (Said, January 31-February 6, 2002). In the midst of frenzied jingoism and patriotic rhetoric, a fraudulent thesis like the “clash of civilizations” can leech the imagination, identifying the “Arab” as the “true enemy,” thereby providing the cultural and ideological support for dubious military actions against the true enemy, now alleged to be everywhere. Any war of “our values” against “theirs,” “civilized” against “uncivilized,” “good” versus “evil” should be abhorrent to adult educators who remain committed to exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing across cultures.

How would we actually identify who our “true enemies” are? By what learning processes does an individual, group, or society, arrive at the naming its enemies? If Baptiste thinks, for example, that bombing an abortion clinic to stop doctors from injuring human life is an inauthentic action, then by what criteria does he make his distinctions? Does Baptiste approve of self-styled anarchists heaving stones through windows and clashing with the police because they simply believe that globalization is the “true enemy” of humankind? Would Baptiste have tossed his computer aside and taken up arms with the Sandinistas against the “true enemy,” America? Clarity is needed here. Apparently a great many people have discarded the belief in keeping the conversation going. The postmodern love of difference has disintegrated into a Hobbesian war of my difference against yours. Now some adult educators are being seduced by the romance of violence.

Baptiste worries about none of this. He thinks that adult educators make feeble responses to social injustices, and looks to Michael Newman’s Defining the Enemy (1994) for assistance in thinking through this contention. Fashionable adult education theories are, Newman tells us, “simply too nice, too unfocused, too inward-looking or too mechanistic.” But Newman’s own text is also troubling. On his final page, Newman commits the same error I am accusing Baptiste of making. He says:

But I have argued that violence has been justified in the past, and I accept that it might be justified in the future. So...if I act in solidarity with a group of learners, if I share in their endeavour to take control of their own lives and counteract the effects of those who are holding them
back, and if in this process they canvass action which may lead to violence, I cannot pull out. If I am committed to helping people learn in social action, I must stay. (p. 191)

This is an astounding passage. Does acting in solidarity with a “group of learners” actually mean that I must lose my identity as an educator (and moral actor) in the group itself? Why couldn’t I choose to reject action leading to violence on ethical or other grounds? Why couldn’t I be a critical presence with the learners, counselling them against walking the violent road because of its many negative consequences? Newman the educator does not have to stay with any group of learners who turn from the enlightenment process towards the risky world of violent political action. Newman, the social democrat, has turned into a Jacobin who countenances violent actions to achieve an end chosen by his group of learners.

Taking a cue from Newman’s roasting of adult educators, Baptiste chooses somewhat randomly several adult education theorists (Marsick and Watkins, Mezirow, and Freire) to critique because they are “united in this: when it comes to redressing social injustices, they all focus primarily on enlightening victims and perpetrators.” He finds them all wanting because none of them “advocate or explicate ways to coercively restrain perpetrators.” By the time the reader has reached this section in Baptiste’s essay, it is clear that his method of simply looking for something and not finding it is wearing thin. He has posited a normative benchmark—without any argumentative infrastructure—and can wheel around the intellectual scene looking for evidence. In his discussion of his three theorists, Baptiste makes several telling points. But it is just too easy for him to chastise Marsick and Watkins—leading liberal adult education proponents of the learning organization—without a very serious engagement with the business context in our global era. Learning organization theorists (and there are many around these days) tend to work with a normative, ideal model that often downplays the brutal way some organizations treat people. But Baptiste downplays the importance of the languages of a learner-centred discourse of organizational design. Baptiste’s accusation that the “reckless romantics,” Marsick and Watkins, turn the corporation into a “workplace fairyland” because they deny the existence of enemies. Baptiste replaces reckless romanticism with a reckless (and empty) rhetorical radicalism that counsels them to seek out enemies and try to coercively constrain them. Well, perhaps Watkins and Marsick actually believe that the learning organization conceptual frame is one concrete way of facing the enemies of learner- and people-centred work design. It is not the only way, just one modest attempt
in a context where management and employees are still talking. Other people are engaging in a wide variety of actions to make the market serve people's needs. But Baptiste seems to have something else in mind. But what?

Much ink has been spilled on Mezirow's theory in the last few years. Baptiste spills some more, and we don't receive much illumination. His discussion of Mezirow is sloppy and even a little silly. I have never thought of Mezirow as a critical social theorist. But he is a careful proponent of a version of personal "transformational learning" that merits attention. Baptiste does not seem to grasp the distinction between a normative model and empirical reality. He accuses Mezirow of designing a "route to transformation learning and eventual emancipation [that] is entirely free of coercion." It is my understanding that Mezirow is setting out, following Habermas, the ideal speech conditions that must be in place for communicative learning to occur. Mezirow hardly imagines that people live in a "transformational learning wonderland" where "non-confrontational, dialogic transactions are not only the order of the day" and "non-coercive discourse alone, is sufficient to usher in emancipation."

Baptiste contrasts the Mezirowian "Land of Oz" with his everyday world of bountless "social maladies." He doesn't see dialogic discourse anywhere in civil society to behold. Now we get closer to Baptiste's sensibility. He is in pretty deep despair about contemporary America and has given up on communicative action and civil society. Mezirow's transformational learning exists only in some vague hypothetical context. Poor Mezirow has fatal neo-liberal loyalties. Baptiste doesn't bother to reference Mezirow's essay, "Transformation Theory of Adult Learning" (1995), that argues that "dialogue is often made impossible in a society structured by power and inequality and that creating a forum in which participants have the right to speak is inadequate" (p. 55). Those who have criticized Mezirow for not having a developed social theory of learning have often understated the intersubjective dimensions of his theory and been unable to offer a plausible counter-conceptual framework.

Baptiste chastises Freire for failing to "openly authorize or articulate a pedagogy of coercive restraint." Baptiste is upset that Freire failed to talk about "coercing those who perpetuate injustices in Brazil." Without any careful argumentation, Baptiste asserts that Freire construed his "adversaries as misguided foes, not true enemies." Apparently Freire and "most adult educators seem to accord absolute goodness to free, enlightened humans." This is an old rhetorical trick—make a sweeping insinuation without getting down to details. Who among all these adult educators believes in absolute
goodness? Where does Freire actually argue that his adversaries are “misguided foes”? These are important questions because Baptiste is flinging language and accusations around without exploring the really important questions for adult educators. For instance, Brian Fay (1987) provides us with the kind of argumentative structure missing from Baptiste. Fay explores carefully the way the “capacity to use force rests on the self-understandings of those being forced....” (p. 154). In so far as this is so, the educator has some hope.

For if those in power depend on the self-conceptions of the powerless such that their capacity to use force is circumscribed by these conceptions, then in so far as critical theory leads the oppressed to change their self-understandings and thus their conception of the nature of their (proper) relationship to those who are in power over them, then this change in self-conception can be an effective antidote to the use of force by those who oppress them. The capacity of critical social science to empower its audience is directly linked to the purported fact that power is rooted in their self-understandings. (pp. 154-155)

It appears, however, that Baptiste is preoccupied with what Fay labels “monadic force”—that is, force that is exercised “independent of the self-understandings of its objects” (p. 155).

The adult educator’s role in societies ruled by force is to organize the enlightenment process so as to call into question the illegitimate use of force. But the “methods of educational enlightenment and emancipation cannot work if those who are enlightened disappear in the middle of the night and are never heard from again, and/or if access to the theory is cut off from those it is supposed to inspire” (p. 158). Antonio Gramsci rotted to death in Mussolini’s prison; Freire himself was forcibly exiled from Brazil; Salvador Allende was assassinated by Pinochet’s army after he had to come to power; even Gandhi was successful only to the extent that his opponents “limited their use of force in opposition to his movement for independence” (p. 158). It makes lots of sense for adult educators to theorize the limits to the practical effectiveness of enlightenment strategies. “For critical social science [read adult education] cannot be effective if its message never reaches the people it is supposed to enlighten; if those who are enlightened by it are murdered; and if those who evince the slightest interest in what it has to say are imprisoned or tortured or have their means of livelihood taken from them” (p. 159). Here is where Baptiste’s challenge to the field of adult education is strongest.
I think the case of Vaclav Havel, the Czech dissident, reveals one possible way of understanding how adult educators can respond to tyrannical situations. Simply advocating a “pedagogy of coercive restraint” is meaningless and confusing. Even in situations of exceptional difficulty, Havel counsels us, the downtrodden and oppressed always contain within themselves the power to remedy their own powerlessness. Moreover, under certain circumstances the powerful are powerless. Their powerlessness is traceable to five related factors. To start with, the powerful can never control all of the micro-movements of their subjects. The powerful may wish to reduce the citizen to a cog in the machine, but usually they are too stupid or conservative to do that, all the time. Second, the power structure depends upon ideological rituals that become less and less credible (as well as bypassing public debate) as the people become less and less happy. Here a third consideration arises: some may call the ideology a lie, declaring the emperor naked. This possibility, Havel says, is nurtured by the ontological fact that the “everyday, thankless, and never-ending struggle of human beings to live more freely, truthfully, and in quiet dignity” is ultimately not completely repressible. Fourth, misery appears to nip at the heels of imagination, forcing the mind to reflect on the human condition. How has life come to this? Does it have to remain this way? Finally, individuals who “live in the truth” reject the innocent fiction that power is a thing to be grasped or abolished. For Havel, power is not something one “has”; it is relational, so power relations are not reducible to the instruments of power. Power is never imposed upon another. It is more that each individual is caught within a labyrinth of influence, repression, fear and self-censorship which swallows up everyone within it, at the very least rendering them silent. Every person is both the victim and supporter of the system—and potential opponent.

One can imagine, then, that adult educators working inside tyrannical regimes have as their difficult task to organize enlightenment processes (usually clandestinely) to beam critical attention towards how we understand our own “caughtness” within the labyrinth. Only individuals can decide for themselves what forms of action are appropriate in tyrannical circumstances; but the critical adult educator can explore existential issues such as whether there are some things worth suffering for. Are there good reasons to prepare to say out loud, in these awful circumstances, what others may think in solitude? Havel believes that citizen action can be organized. The person can always act (write an open letter, hold a rock concert, a demonstration, give a hard-hitting speech, go on a hunger strike). Yet living in the truth is risky
business. The consequences for the individual are unclear, but these acts can be surprisingly effective. To be sure, totalitarian regimes can hound citizens, drag them from beds, lock them up in psychiatric wards, beat them silly, even murder them. But such tactics prove the point; the powerless have within themselves the power to obstruct normality, to embarrass the authorities, to point to the possibility of living life differently—according to values like trust, openness, responsibility, solidarity, love (Keane, 2000, pp. 268-286).

Another possible way of understanding how adult educators would proceed in exceedingly oppressive and violent conditions is to consider the recent non-violent attempts to confront Israel’s continuing occupation of Palestine. Edward Said has reported that a “new secular nationalist current” has emerged both inside and outside of Palestine. A silent majority of Palestinians, Said observes, neither approve of Arafat’s corrupt regime nor countenance Hamas’s violence. Counting many important Palestinian leaders and civil society organizations (health, education, professional, labour) as their base, this incipient bloc has declared that peace can only come after the occupation ends; that democracy must be strengthened inside Palestine; the decision-making process opened up to more ordinary citizens; that the sovereignty of law and an independent judiciary must be instituted; and public institutions consolidated.

Dr. Mustafa Bargouthi, one of the eminent members of new secular nationalist current, launched an International Solidarity Movement, comprising 550 European observers, who flew in to Palestine. Joined with a well-disciplined young band of Palestinians, these men and women disrupted Israeli troop and settler movement, preventing rock-throwing or firing from the Palestinian side. Perhaps it comes as little surprise that, on January 3rd, after Bargouthi held a press conference in East Jerusalem, that the Israelis arrested him, cracking his knee with the butts of rifles and damaging his head. “Israel has more to fear”, Said tells us, “from someone like Bargouthi, who is a self-possessed, rational and respected Palestinian, than from the bearded Islamic radicals that Sharon lives to misrepresent as Israel’s quintessential terrorist threat. All they do is to arrest him, which is typical of Sharon’s bankrupt policy” (Said, January 10-16, 2002).

To firm up his assertion that adult educators are averse to using coercion, Baptiste outlines several strategies that he believes are appropriate in negotiations and disputes. He thinks that adult educators like Mezirow, Marsick and Watkins are very good in consultative situations. But as soon as conflict gets hot and common interests wane, Baptiste thinks that most adult
educators want to run away. As persons allegedly believing in the absolute
goodness of human beings, they cannot bear to face conflict, averting their
eyes, unwilling to “coercively restrain the perpetrators of injustices.” Baptiste
thinks that adult educators must be willing to embrace three dirty strategies:
credible force, intimidation and manipulation. Again, Baptiste’s analysis of
these three strategies flounders badly because he refuses to make the
distinction between adult educator and citizen or address pressing moral
issues. Interestingly, Baptiste’s illustrations for these dirty concepts slips
between “classroom” and “external world.” He justifies the use of credible
force to stop students from shooting other students or staff. Yes, but the
moment I as teacher try to coerce a crazy student who intends to shoot others,
I am no longer teaching in democratic circumstances. I must act to restore the
ruptured democratic practice of learning together under non-coercive
circumstances.

Baptiste resorts to an end justifies the means form of argument to counter
the white South African farmer who threatened some adult educators when
they wanted to interview his workers. “I fail to see how justice could have
been served in this and similar situations without the use of some form of
intimidation.” Baptiste jumbles together things that should be separated.
First, the interlacing of landholding and violence is deeply rooted in South
Africa and is, where possible, countered by risky forms of citizen political
action (that may or may not have proceeded through the organization of
enlightenment). Second, the role of the adult educator in this situation is to
engage with his oppressed learners under democratic and non-coercive
learning conditions. The adult educator has no moral authority to use some
form of intimidation as an integral part of the learning process. In dangerous,
tyrannical situations it is doubly important to separate the “organization of
enlightenment” from the “organization of action.”

Baptiste also thinks it is okay for educators to “manipulate others when
the situation demands.” Manipulation means that A manipulates B when, by
doing x, A causes B to do y which B would otherwise not have done, without
B’s knowing that A is doing it (Fay, 1987, pp. 120ff). Baptiste confuses the
matter at hand by thinking that because it is okay to “use deception to
prevent thugs from killing our loved ones,” it follows that educators can
manipulate ethically. In contrast, I would argue that manipulation is
essentially a deceptive act that does not permit the manipulated to have
access to knowledge they need to make true and ethical decisions. As an
adult educator, I decidedly must not manipulate my learners in any way,
shape or form. I also believe that, under certain circumstances, I could
engage those who are being manipulated, questioning the way the manipulated may accept the legitimacy of those in charge, who could easily resort to the usual organizational tactics of those in power (e.g., using task forces, controlling appointment procedures).

Baptiste’s account of his work in South Side Chicago is telling in this regard. Assisted by Department of Education monies, Baptiste was set to work with community groups on leadership training programs. He discovered quickly enough that the community had nothing much in common, and that government types were more interested in controlling the budgets than in partnering with the community. At first, Baptiste tried to “stay neutral...” (although he doesn’t tell us what this actually meant in practice). He discovered that his refusal to engage in “unethical practices” enabled the government officials to play him like a fiddle. Their mischief went “virtually unchallenged.” But Baptiste draws an appalling conclusion (akin to Newman’s). “But I hope I learned something: that I ought not (indeed cannot) be neutral; that sometimes I have to take a stand, and that when I take a stand it might mean I have to engage in some form of manipulation—some fencing, posturing, concealment, maneuvering, misinformation, and even all-out deception as the case demands, if I hope to deal effectively with the perpetrators of injustices” (pp. 47-48).

Here we have it, all knotted into one incredible sentence. The educator can be a liar and a manipulator if the case demands it. The end justifies the means. Morality has disintegrated. Havel’s heart-felt cry that citizens in tyrannical political systems “live in the truth” vanishes. Our commitment to fostering cultures of critical public discourse disappears. We are left in the end with a bleak view of life where self-interest confronts self-interest with the outcome dependent on who is successful at this nasty game.

References


